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On first pass, it seems that the majority of research programs inquiring about the nature 
of the mind proceed from a naturalistic base; that is, these research programs seek explanations 
for mental phenomena that are wholly consistent with an established and accepted core of 
scientific knowledge, including but not limited to psychology and neuroscience. Surely, there are 
outliers, but it is difficult for me to imagine a group of cognitive scientists doing science in 
consultation with Aristotle's De Anima (On the Soul) in order to improve their working paradigm 
and hypotheses. Why should scientists today consult an ancient proto-scientist for understanding 
the nature of the mind?  
Cassie Finley's essay, “Aristotle’s Functionalism”, stands out as a commendable work to 
the relevance of ancient ideas to present day philosophical and scientific inquiry about the mind, 
calling us to carefully evaluate the theoretical merits of Aristotle’s psychology–specifically, his 
concept of the psyche (soul). She argues that Aristotle’s concept of the psyche, understood in the 
vein of functionalism, offers a “middle path” solution to the mind-body problem in way that 
traditional dualist and physicalist theories of mind do not (pp. 11). Along the way, she discusses 
the implications of her view with respect to the possibility of strong artificial intelligence (AI) 
and “E” theories of the mind (see Andy Clark and David Chalmers’ “Extended Mind”). 
Moreover, she argues that this “Aristotelian form of functionalism” avoids the problem of 
holism–a prevailing challenge to contemporary varieties of functionalism (pp. 1).  
Finley begins with a concise overview of a couple issues facing dualist and physicalist 
theories of the mind. In discussing Descartes’ interactionist substance dualism, she cites the 
objection from causation, famously attributed to Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia: if the mental 
and the physical exist separately as distinct, free-standing substances, how do we explain causal 
interaction between the two? In discussing reductive physicalist views of the mind, she cites an 
thesis respectfully defended by Thomas Nagel and David Chalmers: it is a falsehood to think that 
mental phenomena (namely, consciousness) can be explained away in terms of lower-level 
physical facts because such explanations fail to explain “raw feels” or qualia, which are typically 
thought to be fundamental constituents of human subjective experience.  
 As the title of her essay suggests, Finley’s argument is situated in her discussion of 
functionalism–the view that mental states just are the functioning of relevant causal input and 
output mechanisms, regardless of the underlying substrate(s) that might realize mental activity. I 
take her argument to be (roughly) the following: Aristotle employs his concept of the psyche 
(soul) in order to classify kinds of living things (plants, nonhuman animals, and humans) with 
respect to their faculties and functions. Human beings have the same faculties and functions as 
plants and nonhuman animals but additionally have the distinguishing faculty and corresponding 
function of nous (‘intellect’ or ‘mind’). If we accept the “mind” (construed in contemporary 
philosophical terms) can be identified with a collection of faculties and functions that renders the 
Aristotelian classification of a “human soul”, we are left with an Aristotelian form of 
functionalism by which we can begin to offer possible solutions to a few puzzles that preoccupy 
Cartesian dualists and reductive physicalists.  
Having argued for this Aristotelian construal of functionalism, Finley then argues that 
this view allows for a possible solution to the mind-body problem, charting a course between 
Cartesian dualism and reductive physicalism. Given that the psyche is the form of the body and 
that the body is the matter of the psyche, Aristotelian functionalism avoids the objection from 
causation that seemingly plagues the Cartesian view of the mind. Under this view, we are able to 
understand the mind in non-reductive terms in relation to the body.  
I am particularly interested in her discussion of nous (mind or intellect), a part of the 
human soul,  and its relation to her claim that this Aristotelian functionalism allows for the mind 
and body to be conceptually distinct while being “one and the same” (pp. 6). She refers to De 
Anima Book III 4 in order to support her claim that the mind (nous) is realized functionally by 
the human capacity or disposition to think and reason. She makes a reasonable point here, but I 
would be interested to hear what she thinks about Book III 5, which has been the subject of 
hermeneutical controversy (see SEP article on “The Active Mind of De Anima iii 5”). According 
to some translations, Aristotle seems to imply that “there is another mind (read nous), which is 
what it is by virtue of the fact that it makes everything; it is a sort of condition like light” (DA 
430a16–17). He goes on further to say that “this second mind is separable, incapable of being 
acted upon, mixed with nothing, and in essence an actuality...only when it is separated that it is 
fully itself” (DA 430a23-35). Moreover, without this second mind, “nothing thinks” (DA 
430a26). This leads me to my first question: If we interpret Aristotle in this way–that is, if we 
accept that he is positing a second nous that is in fact separable–then how do we square this with 
an Aristotelian functionalism? 
I found Finley’s claim–that Aristotelian functionalism offers a possible solution to the 
problem holism–quite thought provoking. Referencing the problem of holism, she states: “In 
order to define the mind, there must be a cohesion across all minds, regardless of whether that 
coherence is based in functionalism or not” (my emphasis; pp. 11). Perhaps this Aristotelian 
functionalism can plausibly account for some sort of ‘loose’ cohesion across human minds 
grounded in basic biology, however, I must admit that I am suspicious toward the very 
preoccupation with cohesion when it comes to minds that their mental activity (i.e., cognitive, 
conative, and affective states). My hunch is that if we preoccupy ourselves with seeking out a 
cohesion across all minds, how can we be certain that this preoccupation is not obstructing the 
discovery and discussion of possible subtleties in mental activity contingent on cultural and 
social aspects of human nature? In their article, “The Weirdest People in the World?”, Joseph 
Hendrich, Steven J. Heine, and Ara Norenzayan speak to this very question. Their article shows 
that a great deal of psychological literature draws conclusions about human nature on the basis of 
“samples drawn from Western, Education, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) 
societies”–a rather unique group of individuals to be drawing conclusions about human nature 
from (pp. 61). Hence, my second and final question: how might this Aristotelian functionalism 
make sense of the possible mental subtleties of those humans that do not fall within the WEIRD 
domain?  
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